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Climate change has caused devastating impacts throughout the world. The
regions that are most vulnerable to these impacts are the Arctic and low-lying
island nations. Low-lying nations potentially face more difficulties than
communities and states in the Arctic, however. These island nations must not
only absorb and respond to climate change impacts, but they also face potential
loss of sovereignty because relocation to a foreign country will likely be
necessary in the near future for many of them.1 Because devastating physical,
economic, and cultural impacts threaten to displace populations in island
nations, immediate action is necessary from the international community to
assist these nations in adapting to these impacts and to continue to thrive
culturally and politically.
Professor Maxine Burkett is one of the leading scholars in the world on
climate justice, and her work has spearheaded scholarship involving the rights
of island nations in addressing climate change impacts.2 Climate justice can be
divided into (1) compensation and liability and (2) sovereignty and relocation.
Professor Burkett’s article evaluated in this comment addresses the former
category.3 Her article proposes a Small Island Compensation and Rehabilitation
Commission (CRC) that would provide compensation for climate loss and
damage for slow-onset loss caused by climate change.4
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The internal displacement that Arctic indigenous communities face is equally tragic and demands
urgent domestic attention. See generally Randall S. Abate, Corporate Responsibility and Climate
Justice: A Proposal for a Polluter-Financed Relocation Fund for Federally Recognized Tribes
Imperiled by Climate Change, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10 (2013).
From 2009 to 2012, Professor Burkett served as the inaugural Director of the Center for Island
Climate Adaptation and Policy (ICAP) at the University of Hawai‘i William S. Richardson School
of Law. As the Director of ICAP, she led projects to address climate change law, policy, and
planning for island communities in Hawai‘i, the Pacific region, and beyond. In 2010, she served as
the Wayne Morse Chair of Law and Politics at the Wayne Morse Center, University of Oregon, for
the Center’s “Climate Ethics and Climate Equity” theme of inquiry. Professor Burkett has written
extensively on climate justice and island adaptation issues. For a sampling of this scholarship, see
generally Maxine A. Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small Island Developing
States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633 (2013); Maxine A.
Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability for Failure to
Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 775 (2013); Maxine A. Burkett, Litigating
Climate Change Adaptation: Theory, Practice, and Corrective (Climate) Justice, 42 ENVTL. L. REP.
11144 (2012); Maxine A. Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 115 (2011); Maxine A. Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509 (2009);
Maxine A. Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic
Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008).
Professor Burkett has also examined the sovereignty and relocation aspects of climate justice.
See, e.g., Maxine A. Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 89 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E.
Wannier eds., 2015).
See generally Maxine A. Burkett, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation
Mechanism for Small Island States, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 81 (2015).
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Professor Burkett’s article is a timely, ambitious, and significant contribution
to the literature on climate change compensation and liability. In the most
recent Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United National Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Warsaw, Poland in November
2013, a Climate Loss and Damage Mechanism was drafted.5 Although an
important step in the right direction, this mechanism is a largely aspirational,
mere first step toward providing meaningful climate justice to island nations.
Professor Burkett’s article seeks to accelerate the process of providing relief for
slow-onset climate loss and damage for island nations.
With full appreciation for Professor Burkett’s thoughtful and ambitious
undertaking in proposing the CRC for small island nations in her article, this
comment addresses some concerns about her approach. The comment proceeds
from a simple thesis: climate adaptation measures are best applied in the
contexts of “prevention” and “cure.” First, climate adaptation funding and
implementation makes most sense when addressed as a proactive measure to
enhance a country’s ability to respond to and absorb climate change impacts.
Second, climate change adaptation responses should again be engaged at the
back end of the process, when nations or communities within them are forcibly
displaced from their homelands by rising sea levels or other extreme climate
change-related events. The middle ground between these two ends of the
spectrum is where Professor Burkett focuses her analysis, and it is in this
context where several conceptual and logistical challenges arise.
The starting premise of Professor Burkett’s article is uncontroversial. The
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) nations are on the “front lines” of
climate change impacts. They will be among the first to experience extreme
disruption from climate change impacts, and they are among the least
equipped—financially and technologically—to adapt to these changes.
Therefore, AOSIS nations need climate adaptation assistance from the
international community to ensure their continued survival as nations and
peoples.

5.

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conf. of the Parties, 19th Sess., Nov. 11–22,
2013, Draft Decision -/CP.19, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated
with Climate Change Impacts, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/L.15 (Nov. 22, 2013), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/in-session/application/pdf/fccc.cp.2013.l.15.pdf.
For a helpful background discussion of the UNFCCC foundation for a loss and damage
mechanism, see Ilona Millar et al., Making Good the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage
Mechanism under the UNFCCC Process, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 433 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds.,
2013).

127

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2015)

The first obstacle to Professor Burkett’s approach concerns the scope of
coverage. While it is true that many of the smaller AOSIS nations are in
imminent peril of disappearing within the next few decades and would benefit
greatly from the remedies that the CRC could offer, many other climate justice
communities throughout the world face similar perils. Therefore, there would
be a problem of inequitable scope in implementing Professor Burkett’s CRC
funding mechanism because it would be limited to AOSIS nations, yet other
climate justice communities, such as the least developed nations in Africa and
indigenous communities in the Arctic, would be ineligible for CRC funding
despite their comparable need for assistance.
The logistics of climate adaptation are complex and have left gaps in other
contexts as well. For example, under the Green Climate Fund,6 developed
nations are committed to provide funding for a mechanism to support mitigation
and adaptation measures in developing countries. Yet, indigenous communities
in the Arctic may not receive assistance from this fund because only developing
nations are eligible for Green Climate Fund assistance. Moreover, Arctic
indigenous communities in the U.S. are not eligible to receive relocation
assistance until after disaster strikes, and only for a limited number of
enumerated natural disasters. Slow-onset climate change impacts, such as
coastal erosion, are not among the enumerated natural disasters. Worse still,
even if such communities were eligible for FEMA assistance, such assistance
only supports temporary, rather than permanent, relocation costs.7
Given these inequalities among similarly situated climate-vulnerable
populations, the focus should first be on “prevention” in addressing climate
adaptation. This approach should be implemented at the international and
domestic levels. At the international level, developed nations should contribute
to funds like the Green Climate Fund to assist developing nations with
adaptation measures before climate change-related disaster strikes. Similarly,
in developed nations, there should be domestic climate adaptation funds to
assist vulnerable populations like the indigenous communities in the Arctic, the
United States, and Canada.
This proactive “prevention” assistance for climate adaptation is an important
first step, but it is not enough by itself. Climate change impacts will continue to

6.

7.
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U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2009, Decision
1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action under the Convention, ¶ 102, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15,
2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/ 07a01.pdf#page=17
(establishing the Green Climate Fund).
See generally Abate, supra note 1.
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progress rapidly, and many of these vulnerable communities and nations will
soon need assistance in the form of a “cure”—financial and technological
assistance to secure a new place to call home. Such relocation may take two
forms. First, it could involve internal relocation within the same nation, such as
with Arctic indigenous communities. Second, it could involve transplanting
climate refugee populations from an island nation to another nation for
permanent residence in order to avoid the inevitable loss of habitability in their
homeland due to sea-level rise.
It is here where Professor Burkett’s proposal faces many additional
challenges. By focusing on what happens between “prevention” and “cure” in
the climate adaptation context, Professor Burkett’s laudable proposal suffers
from many logistical challenges concerning (1) the limitations of science, (2) the
challenges of effectively administering the fund, (3) economic shortfalls from
donor fatigue, and (4) a likely absence of political will to support such a fund.
Providing compensation for slow-onset events relating to climate change—for
example, a loss of a fishery or a coral reef system due to ocean acidification—is
difficult from the perspective of science for at least two reasons. First, it is
difficult to determine when a resource is “lost” and eligible for compensation
under this proposal. Second, it is also difficult to determine an exclusive
connection to climate change for that loss.
Natural resources are resilient and are able to function in an impaired state
for a long time. Therefore, it is difficult to determine with precision when a
resource moves from “impaired” to “lost,” such that it would be eligible for CRC
compensation. Slow-onset climate change impacts are not concrete, catastrophic
events of limited duration, as such events are a much better foundation for a
compensation fund. In the climate change context, multiple natural and
anthropogenic factors are involved in causing ocean acidification, for example.
Some of these factors are related to climate change (such as increased
atmospheric carbon dioxide settling into ocean waters), while other factors
contributing to ocean acidification are unrelated to climate change (such as
other land-based pollution sources that are discharged directly into waters).
Regarding the administration of the CRC fund, one challenge is how to
determine who would administer the payments and what criteria would be
applied to prioritize them. The fact that both governments and individuals
would be eligible to submit claims to the CRC raises a concern regarding
possible duplication of payments to governments and groups or individuals for
the same loss.
Perhaps, a better approach would be to appoint an
ombudsperson for each country through which all CRC claims would need to be
filed and administered. Given that many claims would be filed for CRC
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consideration, extensive guidelines would also need to be in place regarding how
to prioritize such claims. The question arises as to whether it would be possible
to properly prioritize voluminous meritorious claims when the pool of funds is
finite. How can one properly decide which claim is more important—the loss of
a fishery in Jamaica or the loss of a coral reef system in Barbados—where both
countries have extensive economic, ecosystem, and cultural reliance on such
resources?
The economic realities associated with Professor Burkett’s proposal are
similarly complex and problematic. The pool of available funding is limited and
subject to the good will of the developed nations and potential private sector
sources that would contribute to ensure the continued viability of the fund. The
fund could easily face problems of donor fatigue and withdrawal of “buy in” for
the CRC concept if claims proliferate to the point where maintaining funding
would pose severe economic hardship for the donors. In addition, from a moral
perspective, donors are much more likely to be generous in supporting relocation
of island nations’ peoples even if it is exceedingly costly, as opposed to being
“nickeled and dimed” for incremental costs associated with the loss of resources
on the path toward climate change devastation.
The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) as a model for the CRC is well
intentioned but analytically flawed. Victims of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait
suffered tangible losses associated with a catastrophic event of limited duration.
The UNCC did succeed in providing broad-based relief from losses, including
environmental damage associated with this conflict.8 Building on the success of
the UNCC, the BP Oil Spill Fund worked effectively to compensate victims
because this context also involved a concrete, catastrophic event of limited
duration. Harms in these contexts—economic and environmental losses in
wartime and those associated with an oil spill—were readily identifiable, and
causation was not an issue.
Unfortunately, calculating the climate change-related losses for which the
CRC would be responsible to determine compensation eligibility and amounts is
a much less precise enterprise than the UNCC and BP Oil Spill Fund. A better
approach to avoid the vagaries of calculating these elusive loss assessment

8.
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See generally Daniel A. Farber, The UNCC as a Model for Climate Compensation, in GULF
WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 242
(Cymie Payne & Peter Sand eds., 2011) (arguing that the UNCC’s recognition of wartime
impacts on the environment as cognizable under international law may establish a foundation
for compensation for climate change impacts). Nevertheless, even though the UNCC arguably
paved the way for compensation for environmental damages beyond those damages related to
property losses, the leap from losses such as those involved in the UNCC and BP oils spill
contexts to slow-onset climate loss is simply too ambitious.
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determinations is two-fold: (1) funding to island nations for climate adaptation,
and (2) a relocation funding mechanism. Residents of island nations will only
relocate once, when their homeland becomes uninhabitable due to grave health
and safety risks, and there must be a process and funding in place to secure a
new and safe homeland for the climate displaced. The international community
is unlikely to be willing or able to provide funding and political will to support
more than these two costly investments.
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